Effectiveness of forced labour import bans (updated)

This is an updated version of the Effectiveness of forced labour import bans Policy Brief (first published in December 2021), authored by Dr Sofia Gonzalez De Aguinaga from the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law.

This Policy Brief assesses the evidence base on the effectiveness of Forced Labour Import Bans - regulatory trade instruments developed by States that restrict the importation of goods into a given market on the grounds of forced labour (private and/or state-imposed). It does so by undertaking a desk-based review of publicly available evidence in English of Forced labour import bans developed and in force by December 2024 and analysing the evidence against an effectiveness framework developed and used by the Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC).

This update is undertaken in light of the increasing development of forced labour import bans in Europe and North America and the need to better understand the role of trade measures, in particular of forced labour import bans, as a lever to address forced labour in global supply chains.

On November 2024, the European Council adopted a Regulation prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market. In October 2024, the government of Canada launched a public consultation to strengthen the forced labour import provision introduced in 2020 into its Customs Tariff Act in compliance with Article 23.6 of the 2020 North American trade agreement (the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Also in compliance with it, in 2023 Mexico introduced an Agreement that establishes the goods which importation is subject to regulation. In 2021 the US passed the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act which targets the state-imposed forced labour in the Uyghur Autonomous Region (Uyghur Region hereafter) in China to complement its forced labour import prohibition contained in section 307 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 (hereafter section 307). See Annex for an overview of these instruments.

The desk-based review and analysis of the evidence on the effectiveness of forced labour import bans undertaken for this research is mostly based on section 307 and the UFLPA, as these have been the only bans widely enforced so far. The evidence is expected to increase with time as the implementation of the bans increases.

While it is not yet possible to provide a conclusive answer as to their effectiveness, due to limited, mixed and relatively low quality publicly available evidence, forced labour import bans may be part of a “smart mix” of measures to address modern slavery in global supply chains as they have, to some extent, prevented some products made with forced labour from entering a market, and, in some cases influenced some changes in businesses and governments affected by these bans that relate to identifying, preventing, mitigating, monitoring and remediating forced labour in global supply chains.

This Policy Brief provides key findings from the desk-based review and analysis of the evidence in relation to the below seven thematic sections:

The concept of forced labour import bans and its relevance to modern slavery;
The development and implementation of forced labour import bans;
The effectiveness of forced labour import bans in addressing modern slavery;
The actual or potential practical impacts of forced labour import bans on businesses and governments;
The connections between forced labour import bans with other related policy areas;
Actual or potential wider consequences of forced labour import bans;
Priorities for future research.

Events

Lunchtime seminar: Effectiveness of forced labour import bans

Online event looking at evidence and best practice around forced labour import bans

Key findings

So far, forced labour import bans have only been developed in the Global North, but they are not homogenous (see Annex 1).
Forced labour import bans have generally not been developed or implemented in consultation with people with lived experience or following impact assessments (see section 2.1).
There is evidence of section 307 of the US Tariff Act of 1930 and the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act preventing the entry of some products made with forced labour into the US market, but importers have found different routes of entry including through “transshipment” methods and the “de minimis” exception (see section 3.1).

- The “consumptive demand” exception of the US Tariff Act of 1930 significantly limited the enforcement of section 307 until 2016 (see sections 2.2 and 3.1).

- There is no publicly available evidence of the Mexican or the Canadian bans preventing the entry of products made with forced labour despite the Canadian ban being in force since 2020 and the Mexican since 2023.

A “rebuttable presumption” that shifts the burden of proof onto importers, the implementing authorities’ enforcement and investigative resources and capacities, and the ban’s interaction with associated domestic trade policies may influence the extent to which forced labour import bans prevent products made with forced labour from entering a market, but more research is needed to confirm this. (see section 3.1).
There is evidence of section 307 influencing change in large suppliers in the Global South who were affected by a ban that directly targeted specific companies, but the evidence is limited to a few case studies (see section 3.2).

- These include changes in corporate policy, governance, grievance mechanisms, and remediation.

- The limited evidence suggests forced labour import bans influence change in suppliers in the Global South via direct and indirect economic pressures that can be attributed to these bans and the that the more pressures are in place—from diverse stakeholders including international buyers— the more likely it may be that the bans, together with other tools, trigger changes in supplier behaviour.

- It is unclear if and when these corporate changes translate into sustainable improvements in workers’ working conditions, especially from the workers’ perspectives.

There is evidence of the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act influencing lead firms’ partial divestment from the Uyghur Region, and anecdotal evidence of lead firms exiting the region (see section 3.2).

- Lead firms in the solar sector have reduced their sourcing from the Uyghur Region by bifurcating their supply chains.

- Some lead firms have announced their exiting from the Uyghur Region, but there is no evidence of this crystallising in practice.

- There is not publicly available evidence of lead firms cutting ties with specific suppliers in association with bans issued under section 307 (see section 6).

There is evidence of section 307, among other factors, influencing change in the behaviour of governments affected by a ban that targets a whole industry (e.g., seafood in Taiwan, rubber gloves in Malaysia, cotton from Turkmenistan)—even if the bans do not explicitly aim to do so. (See section 3.3)

- These changes include public policy reforms (see Malaysia case study), prosecution of perpetrators (see Taiwan case study), and a reduction in the use of state-imposed forced labour (see Turkmenistan case study).

There is no evidence of the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act and section 307 influencing a reduction in the use of state-imposed forced labour in the Uyghur Region—even if the bans do not explicitly aim to do so.

- This may partially be related to the ethnopolitical goals that drive state-imposed forced labour in the Uyghur region, which extent and mechanisms of coercion differentiates it from other state-imposed forced labour contexts.

There is evidence of sustained economic pressures from multiple actors (including customers’ boycotts), among other factors, influencing the elimination of systemic and systematic state-imposed forced labour in Uzbekistan—despite there not being a ban that targets that country (see Uzbekistan case study).

- However, there are still instances of state-imposed and privately imposed forced labour in Uzbekistan partially related to an increasingly challenging economic situation in the country, the persistence of the state control system over the cotton harvest, and the lack of freedom of association and bargaining power for farmers.

While so far none of the forced labour import bans in force mandate remediation to rightsholders as a condition to lift a ban, when remediation has been required under section 307 it has led to economic compensation to workers.

There is little evidence of forced labour import bans preventing forced labour (see section 3.3).

- Forced labour import bans allow economic actors (i.e., businesses and investors) to continue profiting from forced labour by not prohibiting the re-exportation of detained or seized goods, they do not target companies at different levels in the supply chain, and do not conceptualise remediation as prevention.

- Advocates may play a role in the potential of forced labour import bans to prevent forced labour. For instance, advocates have used Sec. 307 to file petitions that target lead firms at the top of the supply chain, but a ban has never been issued in response. Advocates may also file a petition to shift power towards workers, but such petitions have not been filed yet.

In theory, forced labour import bans could potentially complement other regulatory measures aiming to address forced labour in global value chains (such as trade sanctions and mandatory human rights due diligence legislation). However, it is too early to have evidence on this as the bans have not co-existed with these instruments at all or for long enough (see section 5).

Lead firms and suppliers need to absorb the costs of complying with forced labour import bans, but these are likely to vary and the forced labour import bans laws do not specify which businesses are to absorb which costs (see section 4).

- Sec. 307 has mostly targeted suppliers at the centre of supply chains and as a result these have been absorbing significant costs (compared to lead firms), such as those related to remediation (see Malaysia rubber gloves case study).

Governments need to absorb the costs of enforcing the bans, but these are likely to vary according to the enforcement mechanism of the ban, and the existing resources and capacities of the implementing authorities.

- Governments that develop forced labour import bans may need to invest in additional human resources, capacity building, technology systems (especially traceability), and in producing guidance for companies (see section 4.2).

There is limited and mixed evidence on whether forced labour import bans have negative consequences on trade. (See section 6).

- There is only evidence of countermeasures by China, influenced by the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act and section 307, among other factors. This may partially be related to factors external to the ban itself (e.g., existing geopolitical tensions), but more research is needed.

- Production capacity for different materials largely produced in the Uyghur region is expanding into other countries, including the US.

There is limited and mixed evidence on whether forced labour import bans have negative consequences on rightsholders (e.g., job and wage losses). (See section 6).

- Allegedly, the bans on Malaysian glove manufacturers negatively impacted workers, but at the same time a systematic analysis of cases under section 307 did not find evidence of negative impacts on workers.

Having forced labour import bans (that do not prohibit re-exportation) in some countries but not in others, may lead to some becoming “dumping grounds” of products made with forced labour.